The Man Comes Around – Johnny Cash
In my experience, the most common name people resort to when they are trying to communicate the idea “some random country way off in Africa” is Zimbabwe. I understand why: it sounds vaguely exotic and no one really knows enough about it to differentiate it from their general idea of Africa.
I would certainly count myself among those with little more than a few vague ideas, but I spent awhile this month researching what’s going on there, and it’s really a situation deserving a lot more attention from the West than it’s getting.
Colonized by the British, it became known as Southern Rhodesia after that noted colonialist (and racist) Cecil Rhodes. After a series of internal uprisings, wars, and a protracted struggle for power, Zimbabwe finally emerged out of the wreckage of Rhodesia in the late 1970s, with its new leader Robert Mugabe winning a landslide victory in 1980.
While it is common to hear complaints about “corrupt dictators” in Africa, Mugabe is pretty clearly a cut above the rest. There is far more Mobutu in him than Nyerere. From the beginning of his regime there have been complaints of violent suppression of dissent, torture, state-directed ethnic violence, suppression of the free press, and intense corruption.
In spite of this, for quite a long time, Zimbabwe looked to have a bright future. Literacy rates there are among the highest in Africa, they have a decent supply of natural resources, and were long able to stay self-sufficient in agriculture and most other essentials. However, a good framework means little if it is managed by a incompetent and corrupt government.
The current crisis has been long in developing, but truly came to a head in the late 90s over land-use issues. Thanks to the legacy of colonialism, land distribution remained extremely unbalanced, with white farmers in possession of a majority of the country’s commercially viable farmland despite comprising only 1% of the population.
Clearly, this situation was unsustainable. Unfortunately, Mugabe’s attempt at “reform” was to institute compulsory land redistribution from rich whites to those loyal to Mugabe, replacing one group of powerful land owners with another, but doing nothing to resolve the underlying rich/poor divide. While the white farmers were clear beneficiaries of an unjust history of colonialism, they quickly became scapegoats, persecuted to justify a series of crackdowns.
Moreover, at least in the years prior to the reform, those on the land were capable and committed to the project of agricultural production. The new owners were far more concerned with political control than with the country’s production needs. This expansion of corruption and the patchwork implementation of the land reform caused a sharp decline in agricultural production, turning a country that once was a virtual breadbasket of sub-Saharan Africa into one facing serious food shortages. And, the more that the essential daily needs were in the hands of those loyal to Mugabe, the more such necessities became a political tool. Those who spoke out found themselves without access to food or basic health services.
Many have suggested that this scheme was concocted in part to divert the populace’s attention from Zimbabwe’s expensive, bloody, and unjustified involvement in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Dwindling domestic production contributed to rising inflation, a problem which has expanded enormously in the past couple years. Inflation has turned into hyperinflation, which has turned into a virtual economic shutdown. Official statistics put current inflation rates at several thousand percent, but most unofficial estimates put it at somewhere above 10,000%, a virtually unimaginable rate. Stories abound of people literally running to the store with their paycheck to buy food before the value of the currency collapses, of stores changing prices by the hour, of medical workers barely making enough to cover their bus fare,
The government’s “solution” has been price controls, which would be laughable if the consequences were not so dire. I’m no master of economics, but even I can tell you that creating a price limit for goods in a hyperinflating economy is simply a recipe for forcing stores out of business, if they are only allowed to charge, for example, $5 for a loaf of bread that cost them $10 to obtain. It should not be surprising that virtually the entire economy has therefore gone underground – any hope of getting the basic necessities most likely requires some knowledge of the black market.
The terminal result: collapsing health care system, an 80% unemployment rate (yes, 80 percent!), empty store shelves, decaying public works system, and severe food shortages have combined to bring the average life expectancy of 37 years, down from 60 in 1990. That is the lowest in the world, and is the most shocking of all of these statistics. This is a country that is simply collapsing in on itself.
And the worst part is, it is difficult to even know what we could do. It’s easy to rail about Darfur and demand that we simply commit to making a serious effort, but the problem in Zimbabwe has no easy solution, apart from a committed effort by powers in the region (South Africa, in particular) to oust Mugabe and institute legitimate regime. But even that can hardly been seen as particularly encouraging. Africa is filled with countries with well-minded leaders that quickly fell into the countless economic and political traps. Without a sustainable economic foundation, any long-term political hope for Zimbabwe is weak. And without a strong and well-minded regime, there remains little chance for long-term economic reform.
The small ray of hope is that, in spite of a virtual economic meltdown, the informal economy of barters and trades has filled in to some extent. And, there is some thought that the scale of the crisis will finally be enough to unify a populist backlash and undermine Mugabe’s nationalist support. Moreover, it is possible that as the crisis expands and begins to impose serious costs on even the richest of the society, Mugabe’s support among the elites will crumble.
The target is 2008, when plans have been made to institute a transition government away from Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party. Of course, this relies on Mugabe accepting the inevitably of his removal from power. This is one area where international pressure may have some force, though it’s difficult to say. He fears of prosecution for crimes against humanity, and of being forced to admit the abject failure of his regime may convince him to hold onto every bit of power he can until the day he dies.
As I said, there is no promise that a post-Mugabe regime will be any better, but at least it will be a (somewhat) clean slate, and will have the credibility to ask for international assistance with some ability to promise that the aid might go where it is needed instead of directly into the pockets of Mugabe’s cronies. It’s a slim chance, but it’s better than nothing.